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Abstract
Background: Video calls from mobile phones can improve communication during medical emergencies. Lay
bystanders can be instructed and supervised by health professionals at Emergency Medical Communication
Centers. Before implementation of video mobile calls in emergencies, issues of information security should be
addressed.
Methods: Information security was assessed for risk, based on the information security standard ISO/IEC
27005:2008. A multi-professional team used structured brainstorming to find threats to the information security
aspects confidentiality, quality, integrity, and availability.
Results: Twenty security threats of different risk levels were identified and analyzed. Solutions were proposed to
reduce the risk level.
Conclusions: Given proper implementation, we found no risks to information security that would advocate against
the use of video calls between lay bystanders and Emergency Medical Communication Centers. The identified
threats should be used as input to formal requirements when planning and implementing video calls from mobile
phones for these call centers.
Background
Cardiac arrest, accidents and traumas are leading causes of
death worldwide [1-3]. First rescue activities performed by
lay bystanders, such as calling for help, opening of airways,
and cardio-pulmonary resuscitation, save lives. Emergency
Medical Communication Centers (EMCCs) assist bystan-
ders via telephone, saving time and improving care [4,5].
EMCC operators (dispatchers) often have to act on limited
information, as the description given by bystanders can be
lacking or misleading [4,6,7].
Videoconference enabled mobile phones can be sophis-
ticated tools for dispatcher assisted resuscitation [7,8],
and videoconferencing can improve the confidence of lay
rescuers [9]. Videoconferencing used in communication
between bystanders and EMCCs would enable dispatch-
ers to see the patient and the scene of accident, and may
better instruct bystanders on correct action [7,10,11].
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the
USA announced in November 2010 that America’s 9-1-1
system should be revolutionized by harnessing the life-
saving potential of text, photo, and video in emergencies
[12]. Although a majority of the emergency calls come
from mobile phones [12], call centers currently lack the
technical capability to use the full potential of these new
technologies.
In healthcare, information security and safety are vital
parts of the trust between the public and the care provi-
ders. In most countries this is regulated through laws
and professional standards. Possible undesired effects
should be identified before the implementation of video
calls in EMCCs. In this study, the security challenges of
using mobile telephones for videoconferencing between
lay rescuers and EMCCs were analyzed through a quali-
tative risk assessment of the information security
aspects.
Methods
Risk assessment is a systematic approach for describing
and calculating risks of undesired events. We conducted
risk assessment of information security related to the
use of videoconference calls with mobile phones
between lay bystanders and EMCCs during medical
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information security standard ISO/IEC 27005:2008
developed by the International Organization for Stan-
dardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) [13]. In this standard, risk assessment
is described as a process consisting of risk identification,
risk estimation and risk evaluation. Risk assessment is
performed after context establishment, and the process
may be iterative (Figure 1).
Risk assessment group, workflow and time frame
Risk assessment was performed by a group, led by a risk
assessment expert (EH). Group participants were chosen
from our own institution, based on competencies and
background, such that different areas of expertise were
covered. One anesthetist nurse, one anesthesiologist,
one lawyer, and two computer scientists took part in
this group, which started its work in 2006. After one
iteration of risk assessment including three group meet-
ings, we found that a better understanding of the
intended service was needed, and agreed to postpone
further iterations until the completion of a research pro-
ject [7,9,14]. We expanded our group with a dispatcher
nurse who had used videoconferencing in scenarios of
simulated cardiac arrest, and the risk assessment was
completed through another two iterations with email
discussions and eight group meetings during 2009 and
2010.
Context establishment
The context for this risk assessment was set by describing
the service, legal requirements and definitions. Legal
requirements for communication of sensitive patient-
identifiable information is set by national and European
legislation [15-17]. The consequence of risks were
defined in three categories (low, medium, high), and
values for likelihood were described using four categories
(low, medium, high, very high) (Table 1). Risk (R) is the
product of consequence (C) and likelihood (L): R = C ×
L. In qualitative risk assessment, risk is illustrated in a
two dimensional matrix as a combination of consequence
and likelihood. We defined three levels for risks; low,
moderate and severe (Table 1). Threats with severe risk
are usually unacceptable. If they cannot be avoided or
their risk reduced, it may imply that the new service
should not be implemented.
Risk assessment
Threats to information security with consequences for the
organization or patients were identified. We considered
threats related to legislation and regulations, economic
consequences, reputation, life, and health.
Identification of threats was performed as a structured
brainstorming in the risk assessment group. All ideas for
possible risks were noted and no risks were censored or
rejected at this point. During risk assessment we focused
on confidentiality (c), quality (q), integrity (i), and avail-
ability (a) of information, terms defined by Norwegian
legislation as the aspects of information security [15,16].
Every threat was described and given a unique identifier
where the first character was used to indicate the type of
security aspect (c, q, i, a).
Each threat was analysed by the team for the conse-
quence and the likelihood that it would occur, according
to definitions (Table 1). Risk assessment was done for
the new service relative to the existing service with
audio only communication. This means that risks in the
existing service were excluded, unless the new service
would change the risk level.
The identified threats were placed in a two dimen-
sional matrix according to their consequence and likeli-
hood. Each threat was evaluated, and possible actions to
reduce the risks were suggested. The process was con-
tinued until we reached group consensus.
Results
Twenty distinct threats and unwanted situations were
identified and described (Table 2). The likelihood and
consequence were estimated for each threat. The risk
matrix presents all threats with their id, short description
and risk level as a combination of likelihood and conse-
quence (Figure 2). No threats had a severe risk level, but
threats with a high level of consequence should be
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Figure 1 The workflow of risk assessment according to the
information security standard ISO/IEC 27005:2008.
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Page 2 of 7watched closely, as an increase in likelihood can make
these threats severe. We were not able to conclude on
likelihood or consequence for nine threats, either because
it would be dependent on the implementation of the
technology, or related to issues that can only be answered
through clinical trials. It is possible that these threats
could have an unacceptable severe risk.
Different options for risk treatment were suggested.
Several threats can be handled by proper implementa-
tion: the lack of availability of video logs (a3, a4, a5), the
inability to forward video calls (a9), and unauthorized
access to patient information (c2, c3). The loss of dis-
patchers’ identity protection (m1) can be avoided with
one-way videoconferencing, or by transmitting computer
generated images of a dispatcher (an avatar) [18].
Some threats will be influenced by the intellectual
capacity of dispatchers. Training of dispatchers may
reduce the risk level of those threats, such as poor image
quality (q2), misunderstandings due to interpretation of
images or several patients in the same emergency (q3, q4,
q5), and the images receiving too much attention from
dispatchers or bystanders (m2, m3). For some dispatchers
and in some situations the image may be helpful, while at
times images can be an extra burden. EMCCs commonly
use criteria based protocols for advice during emergen-
cies [19-21]. Such protocols should be adapted for video
based dispatch [7,14], which may contribute to reduction
of the risk level for these threats.
The risk level of the remaining threats will be largely
influenced by factors external to EMCCs, such as the
sound quality (q1), time delays when establishing video-
conferencing (a1), the capacity and security of the tele-
communication networks (a2, a7, c1), weather conditions
(a6), and the quality and capacity of callers’ mobile
phones (a7, a8). The risk level of these threats are likely
to decrease with time, as technology and solutions
mature. If users experience problems with sound quality
or other technical problems during a video call, a switch
to audio call may solve the problem, but with a loss of
time.
Discussion
This risk assessment identified twenty threats to informa-
tion security for the use of mobile video calls between
EMCCs and the public. None of these have a severe risk
level (i.e., a combination of high consequence and likeli-
hood). We have suggested ways to decrease or eliminate
the risks, by proper implementation, organization, and
Table 1 Definitions of consequence, likelihood and risk level
Category Description
Consequence
Low For the hospital or the service: No violation of law; or negligible economic loss which can be restored; or small reduction of reputation
in the short run.
For the patient: A minor impact on health; or negligible economic loss which can be restored; or small reduction of reputation in the
short run.
Medium For the hospital or the service: Offence, less serious violation of law which results in a warning or a reprimand; or economic loss which
can be restored; or reduction of reputation that may influence trust and respect.
For the patient: A minor temporary impact on health; or economic loss which can be restored; or small reduction of reputation caused
by revealing of less serious information (e.g. blood pressure level).
High For the hospital or the service: Violation of law which results in penalty or fine; or a large economic loss which cannot be restored; or
serious loss of reputation that will influence trust and respect for a long time.
For the patient: Death or permanent reduction of health; or a large economic loss which cannot be restored; or serious loss of
reputation caused by revealing of sensitive and offending information.
Likelihood
Low Rare, occurs less than every 100th connection. Detailed knowledge about the system is needed; or special equipment is needed; or it
can only be performed deliberately.
Medium May happen, occurs between every 10th and every100th connection. Normal knowledge about the system is sufficient; or normally
available equipment can be used; or it can be performed deliberately.
High Quite often, occurs between every 3rd and every10th connection. Can be done with minor knowledge about the system; or without
any additional equipment being used; or it can be performed by wrong or careless usage.
Very high Very often, occurs more often than every 3rd connection. Can be done without any knowledge about the system; or without any
additional equipment being used; or it can be performed by wrong or careless usage.
Risk level
Low Acceptable risk. The service can be used with the identified threats, but the threats must be observed to discover changes that could
raise the risk level.
Moderate Can for this service be an acceptable risk, but for each threat the development of the risk should be monitored to consider whether
necessary measures have to be implemented.
Severe Not acceptable risk. Cannot start using the service before risk reducing treatment has been implemented.
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Threat id Description
Threats to quality
q1 Sound quality with mobile phone videoconferencing is usually worse than regular calls between mobile phones. Reasons include poor
bandwidth and mobile phones usually in loudspeaker mode during video calls, often with disturbing background noise. This may result
in misunderstandings, lost information and delays.
q2 Poor image quality is a common problem with video calls from mobile phones. Although likely to improve with improved technology,
camera shake, poor light and weather conditions will influence on the image quality. Some image quality problems are due to current
methods for video compression.
q3 The caller may believe that the image is a sufficient description, therefore not describing the situation appropriately, which leads to
misinterpretations.
q4 The dispatcher may believe the image describes the situation sufficiently, and therefore do not ask for important information, which
leads to misinterpretations.
q5 When there are several patients in the same accident or emergency, it is possible to mix-up images from one patient to what is said
about another patient. The image may clarify or complicate matters when much information needs to be sorted out.
Threats to availability
a1 It usually takes more time to establish a phone call with video. Today this is usually a matter of a few seconds, time which may be
saved in successful guidance trough video communication. The caller may however be negatively affected by delays during initiation of
contact with the EMCC, which in turn may affect how the case is handled.
a2 The capacity of mobile phone networks is often reached during larger accidents. Videoconferencing demands more bandwidth than
audio communication, which may be a problem when many people are calling at the same time. In some mobile networks video calls
use a reserved bandwidth, not interfering with the bandwidth used for audio calls. Depending on traffic and network configuration, it
can be easier or more difficult to make a call go through when using video calls.
a3, a4, a5 EMCCs commonly have audio logs of all communication with the public for playback. If the connection with the caller is lost and
cannot be reestablished, audio playback may provide essential information to solve the emergency. Audio logs can also be useful for
debriefing, or when questions later arise if the EMCC should have handled a case differently. If, for some reason, the log is not
available, it may negatively affect patients in cases where connection is lost (threat a3). It may negatively influence the organization if
logs are not available for documentation (threat a4) or debriefing (threat a5). There are several causes for these threats to occur, either
that video is not recorded by default implementation, that playback of videorecordings is difficult, or that such recordings are
corrupted or destroyed.
a6 Mobiles used for videoconferencing is kept out from the body and has greater exposure to weather conditions such as rain and cold
temperatures. This may cause equipment failure and loss of connection.
a7 Technical difficulties because of less stable connection during mobile videoconferencing can delay or disrupt the exchange of
information.
a8 Videoconferencing drain more battery on mobile phones than does audio communication. Use of video may therefore cause more lost
connections. With empty batteries, communication can not be reestablished.
a9 In some situations the dispatcher may want to forward the call to another dispatcher either within the same EMCC or in a different
EMCC. If this is not possible during video calls, the dispatcher may shut down the call and establish an audio call instead. This comes
with a risk of wasting time.
Threats to confidentiality
c1 Telephone communication can be wiretapped. While it takes more advanced technology and skills to wiretap a live videoconference
over a mobile network, the public interest in images from emergencies suggest increased willingness to invest in such technology.
c2 Stored images are likely to be of greater interest and may contain more sensitive patient information than audio logs. Stored video and
images may therefore increase attempts of unauthorized access.
c3 If visitors are allowed into the EMCC, or the images on computer screens can be observed by people outside the EMCC, this may
reveal patient sensitive information. This threat is dependent on local conditions such as placement of computer screens and access
restrictions to the EMCC.
Threats to integrity
No threats to data integrity were identified.
Mixed threats
m1 With two-way videoconferencing the caller may identify the dispatcher. Dispatchers have been concerned that the loss of identity
protection makes them more vulnerable to insults [7].
m2 The EMCC is a demanding work environment, and the introduction of videoconferencing may distract or increase demands on
dispatchers. In the worst case, this may cause inefficiency or delays.
m3 The caller may focus on filming rather than helping the patient. The dispatcher may ask for images, and disturb or interrupt the
treatment the caller otherwise would have initiated. Similar concerns were also raised when resuscitation instructions first was provided
by telephone [29].
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were the greatest technical risks of mobile video calls.
These threats are likely to decrease as technology
improves.
Based on this risk assessment, we believe it is possible
to implement videoconferencing from the public as a
service in EMCCs with acceptable risks. However, some
critical success factors of information systems in the
organization will only be discovered during the imple-
mentation process [22]. A change in work environment
may impose unacceptable loads on human cognitive
abilities and potentially lead to errors, especially in a
transition phase when new routines are being adopted
[23]. When introducing a new service in the high stress
environment of EMCCs, the process should therefore be
closely monitored for unwanted incidents, even if unac-
ceptable risks have not been identified at earlier stages.
Risk assessment should be repeated at regular intervals
to ensure that changes in environment, organization, or
system do not introduce new unacceptable threats and
that known threats do not increase in likelihood or con-
sequence resulting in unacceptable risk levels for the
system.
Risk assessment is a method for identification and eva-
luation of possible factors that may affect different aspects
of change processes and their outcome, such as impact on
services, organization, customers and users. Even the most
thorough risk assessment process can miss out on some
unforeseen consequences. ISO/IEC 27005:2008 outlines
procedures for risk assessment, but several of the steps
can be addressed by using different approaches. We used
qualitative assessments by a multi-professional team. The
composition of the team is important to cover different
threats, but is no guarantee that all possible threats are
found. Qualitative studies rarely give hard facts, but they
can provide information and insight, and guide further
research [24,25]. Our approach was prospective and
addressed a future system at a high level, and has similari-
ties with the Structured What-If Technique (SWIFT),
which is a systematic team-oriented technique for hazard
identification suitable for considering systems where
human and organizational factors predominate [26,27].
Other methods for risk identification such as Hazard and
Operability study (HAZOP), Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) focus on
process flow or hardware, and may be better suited for
assessment of equipment details [26]. When risk assess-
ments are carried out before new systems are implemen-
ted, sometimes even before they are constructed, it is not
possible to do accurate measurements. Risk assessment as
a scientific method therefore needs to be carried out in a
systematic and critical fashion so that each issue can be
discussed and debated openly. There is always a risk of
bias in such discussions, resulting in overly positive or
overly negative analysis. Our risk assessment was based on
previous research in the field [7,9,14,28], and a part of sys-
tematic development of knowledge.
The result of risk assessments provides information for
risk treatment (Figure 1), which involves decisions on
how to reduce risk in an organization. The threats identi-
fied in this risk assessment should be used as input to
formal requirements when planning and implementing
v i d e oc a l l sf o rE M C C s .T h eb e nefit of doing risk assess-
ment before system implementation is that information
security can be incorporated from the beginning.
For all health care service there are several risks
involved - for the patients, for health care workers, for
the organization, and for the service itself. Our risk
Likelihood  Consequence 
  Unknown  Low  Medium  High 
Unknown  q3 & q4: video causes 
undercommunication 
m2: image distracts 
    c3: images observed by 
outsiders 
c2: unauthorized access to 
logs 
a7: technical difficulties 
causes delays 
a8: battery drain 
Low  m3: filming, not helping  a9: no forward call 
a5: no logs for debrief 
a4: no logs for lawyers    m1: dispatcher identified 
c1: wiretapping 
q5: several patients 
a3: no logs when lost call 
a6: weather exposure 
a2: network capacity 
Medium        q1: worse sound 
High  q2: poor image quality       
Very high    a1: establish call takes time     
Figure 2 Risk matrix presenting the identified threats with identifier and short description. Darker shades of grey indicates higher level of
risk: light grey low risk, medium grey moderate risk and darkest grey severe risk. White background is used for threats with unknown risk.
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munication system, namely information exchange and
storage. Risks related to different types of patient condi-
tions should be identified through clinical studies.
A threat may have different outcomes, from common
incidents with no practical implications, to (very rarely) a
chain of events with disastrous results. Poor sound quality,
for instance, may be acceptable in many situations, but
can in other cases cause misunderstandings that lead to
worse patient treatment and possible patient death. For a
new service there are no measurements of unwanted
events, therefore assessments of associated consequence
and likelihood become approximations. We found this led
to a worst-case type of thinking that may have overesti-
mated the risk level of some threats. Further studies are
therefore needed to map type of errors and problems that
may arise when videoconferencing is used during real
emergencies.
Conclusions
Video based communication with lay bystanders during
prehospital emergencies may potentially improve the
quality of prehospital patient care. In previous studies of
simulated cardiac arrest, we have found that video calls
are likely to improve confidence and reduce communica-
tion problems during prehospital medical emergencies
[7,9]. In this risk assessment, we used qualitative methods
to find potential threats to information security of using
such video calls. This study has revealed several issues
that should be considered carefully in requirement speci-
fications for such systems. We did not identify potential
threats with unacceptable high risk levels, which indicates
that it is possible to implement the reception of video
calls from the public in dispatch centers. The time is ripe
to initiate a discussion on how emergency call centers
should implement the new possibilites given by the
mobile multi-media devices carried by a large portion of
the population.
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